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Abstract: An old question in Spinoza scholarship is how finite, non-eternal things 
transitively caused by other finite, non-eternal things (i.  e., the entities described 
in propositions like E1p28) are caused by the infinite, eternal substance, given 
that what follows either directly or indirectly from the divine nature is infinite and 
eternal (E1p21–23). In “Spinoza’s Monism I,”1 I pointed out that most commenta-
tors answer this question by invoking entities that are indefinite and sempiternal, 
but argued that perhaps we should not be so quick to assume that in Spinoza’s 
system, an infinite and eternal substance could cause such indefinite, sempiternal 
entities. But if such eternal-durational causation is denied, then it seems harder 
to see how Spinoza’s system could be coherent: if Spinoza holds that the infinite, 
eternal substance cannot cause anything that is not infinite and not eternal, then 
how can he also hold that all things are modes immanently caused by substance 
(E1p15, E1p18, E1p25)? In this essay, I explain how Spinoza’s system could be 
understood in light of a denial of eternal-durational causation. On the interpre-
tation I offer, God is the cause of all things and all things are modes because the 
essences of all things follow from the divine nature and all essences enjoy infinite, 
eternal reality as modes immanently caused by the infinite, eternal substance. The 
same non-substantial essences can also be conceived as enjoying non-infinite, 
non-eternal reality, but so conceived, they are enduring, finite (or sempiternal, 
indefinite) entities that cannot be conceived as modes caused by and inhering in 
the one infinite, eternal substance. I conclude by pointing out that if we take this 
interpretive route, we do have to understand Spinoza as committed to acosmism, 
or a denial of the reality of the world – at least the world of enduring, finite things.
1  Introduction 
A common view in the 17th-century, one which Descartes calls a “manifest truth,” 
is that a transcendent, infinite, eternal God not only creates formal reality that 
1 “Spinoza’s Monism I,” in the previous issue of this journal.
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is finite (or indefinite), but also continues to sustain that reality over time after 
creation.2 That view figures in the Third Meditation:
All of the time of my life can be divided into innumerable parts, each of which is entirely 
independent of the others, so that from the fact that I existed a short time ago, it does 
not follow that I ought to exist now, unless some cause as it were creates me again in this 
moment, that is, conserves me.3
Whatever the precise details (e.  g., whether there is just one continuing divine act 
of creation or an infinity of distinct acts), Descartes held that an eternal, infinite 
God sustains finite (and perhaps indefinite) things in their formal reality over 
time.4
Descartes can be understood as holding two “dualist” views, each including 
a thesis regarding substances and a corresponding thesis regarding causation. 
First, there is the familiar dualism of created minds and bodies: minds and bodies 
are really distinct formally real created substances, and while each kind of sub-
stance has its own principal attribute, this difference in attribute does not pre-
clude there being causal interaction (secundum fieri) between minds and bodies.5 
Second, there is the dualism of God and created substances just mentioned: a 
unique, eternal, immutable, infinite, necessary substance – God – sustains the 
very being (esse), or formal reality, of created substances over time. 
Spinoza, of course, denies the first dualist view. Spinoza can acknowledge 
that the Cartesians are correct that thought and extension are conceivable inde-
pendently of each other: thinking reality and extramental extended reality are 
each conceived through themselves (E1p10) and each “may be conceived to 
be really distinct” (E1p10s). But Spinoza holds that the Cartesians go wrong in 
2 AT VII.369  f. See also AT VII.48  f., 111, 165, 168  f., and AT III.429. For my purposes here, the 
details of Descartes’ view of divine conservation are not important: what is important is that 
God sustains things in their very being in or over time. For more discussion of Descartes’ view of 
divine causation secundum esse, see Schmaltz 2008, 71–83.
3 AT VII.48  f. (cf. AT VIIIA.13). The created world is indefinite (AT VIIIA.52, AT VIIIA.14  f.). I do 
not take the tensed language of “[God] has existed from eternity and will abide for eternity” (AT 
VII.68) to show that Descartes’ God is sempiternal; it is because God is (timelessly) eternal that it 
is true at all times that God exists (timelessly).
4 The target is upstream from the Cartesian thesis that because “conservation differs solely in 
reason from creation,” there must be “some cause that as it were creates me at this moment, 
that is, conserves me” (AT VII.49. Cf. AT VII.165). This thesis presupposes the intelligibility of the 
causal relation between God and creatures.
5 AT V.347 and V.403  f., AT VII.88, AT IXA.213, and AT XI.359–62. For discussion, see Broughton 
1986, Gorham 1999, and Schmaltz 2008.
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failing to see that causation must be understood within an attribute and in failing 
to appreciate that one cannot take the conceptual independence of the attributes 
to indicate that there is not just one substance that can be conceived under dif-
ferent attributes.
What about the second Cartesian “dualism”? Spinoza denies that there are 
created substances: there is one substance and that substance’s modes. So, it is 
obvious – and has long been recognized as obvious – that Spinoza denies the 
part of the second Cartesian dualist view that posits created substances distinct 
from God. However, I think Spinoza is more critical of the causal thesis associ-
ated with this dualism than has been appreciated. Because Spinoza refers to the 
things in E1p28 as modes, and because he says God immanently causes all modes, 
commentators have understandably sought a way of causally linking the infinite 
and eternal God and enduringly real finite things. However, as I argued in “Spi-
noza’s Monism I,” an eternal, infinite substance’s immanent causation of some-
thing non-eternal and non-infinite – even if that something is sempiternal and 
indefinite – involves an inexplicable shift in realities that renders the immanent 
causation (and inherence of effect in the cause) hard to understand. If only intelli-
gible causation is genuine causation, then eternal-durational, infinite-indefinite 
causation has got to go.
But if an infinite, eternal God cannot cause anything enduring, even if that 
thing is everlasting and indefinite, then how can God be the cause of all things?
Here is the proposal I will explore here. God, conceived under any attribute, 
can only be properly conceived as eternal and infinite: the divine essence can 
only be conceived as enjoying eternal and infinite formal reality, and substance 
can only be conceived as caused by substance. Yet each of the essences following 
with necessity from the divine nature can be conceived, within the same attribute, 
either as enjoying non-eternal (enduring) and non-infinite (finite or indefinite) 
formal reality or as enjoying eternal and infinite formal reality. What cause(s) or 
effect(s) something depends not just on the attribute it is conceived under, but 
also on whether the formal reality its essence is conceived as enjoying is infinite 
and eternal or non-infinite and non-eternal. If an essence is conceived as endur-
ingly real, then it is a thing that only has enduringly real transitive causes and 
effects.6 But that same essence can be conceived as having eternal, infinite formal 
reality, in which case it is something immanently caused by and inhering in the 
6 This is so whether the enduring thing is finite or indefinite. In the former case, its causes and 
effects include other finite enduring things (as well as itself; see LeBuffe 2018, ch. 1, for discus-
sion), while in the latter case, its cause will be itself at some temporally prior point and its effects 
will be itself at some temporally posterior point.
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eternal and infinite substance.7 The eternal, infinite substance is the cause of 
all things because a) all essences follow from the divine nature and b) every one 
of these essences is, conceived sub specie aeternitatis, an eternal, infinite mode 
caused by the eternal, infinite substance.8
On this proposal, an eternal, infinite substance’s immanent causation of 
its modes does not involve an inexplicable shift in realities: modes immanently 
caused by the infinite, eternal substance are literally ways in which substance’s 
own infinite, eternal reality is modified.9 Yet the proposal does require that we 
interpret Spinoza’s claims that finite, enduring things are ‘modes’ (see, e.  g., 
E1p25c) not as claims that those things are in the infinite, eternal substance 
qua finite and enduringly real things, but as claims that the essence of each of 
those things is, when conceived as enjoying infinite and eternal reality, a mode 
in substance. Strictly speaking, all modes of the infinite, eternal substance are 
infinite and eternal.10 The proposal also requires, more dramatically, that we 
read Spinoza as a kind of acosmist, someone who denies the world, or cosmos: if 
enduring, finite formal reality cannot be understood as caused by God, properly 
conceived, then that enduring, finite reality turns out to be ersatz reality.
7 Cf. D. Garrett’s 2009 interpretation of “formal essences.” Although Garrett agrees that the 
(eternal) formal essence of a thing is an infinite mode, I am not sure he agrees that the reality 
this essence enjoys is timelessly eternal (rather than sempiternal). According to Garrett, the for-
mal essence of a singular thing is the “omnipresent modification or aspect of an attribute of God 
that consists in the attribute’s general capacity to accommodate – through the general laws of 
its nature as an attribute – the actual existence of a singular thing of the given specific structure 
whenever and wherever the series of actual finite causes should actually determine it to occur.” 
This “general modification of the attribute” follows from more general laws of nature and is, like 
the laws of nature, “permanent and pervasive” (D. Garrett 2009, 290. Cf. Martin 2008, Ward 2011). 
Garrett’s description is at least compatible with understanding extension’s “general capacity to 
accommodate […] the actual existence” of a body as a capacity of extension understood as some-
thing enduring: it is because enduring extended reality has the permanent and pervasive features 
it has (the laws of nature and the formal essence following from them) that it can, given certain 
actual finite, determinate modifications, come to be modified in some finite, determinate way.
8 Melamed thinks the distinction natura naturans/natura naturata coincides with the distinction 
eternal/durational (Melamed 2013, 110  f.). On my view, the distinctions do not coincide, as natura 
naturata can be considered either as eternal, infinite modes or as enduring finite (or indefinite) 
things. But natura naturata implies natura naturans’ activity, so perhaps ‘natura naturata’ is the 
term to use when we want to consider things as modes inhering in substance. This would fit with 
E1p29s’s claim that natura naturata are “modes of God’s attributes insofar as they are considered 
as things which are in God” (my emphasis).
9 See “Spinoza’s Monism I,” Section 3.2.
10 See Primus 2019, in which I argue that E1p21–23 can be read as supporting the conclusion that 
an infinite, eternal substance’s effects can only be infinite and eternal modes.
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In Section 2, I spell out some more details and answer some objections. In 
Section 3, I address a few textual difficulties. My aim in these sections is not 
to establish, beyond any doubt, that Spinoza’s Ethics must be understood as I 
propose; I just want to say enough to convince readers that the proposal is worth 
exploring further.
In the concluding Section 4, I turn to the acosmist consequence of the inter-
pretation. I will not deny that acosmism brings with it its own perplexities; one 
might even conclude that an acosmist implication is a reductio ad absurdum of 
an interpretation. But, despite the puzzles, I think this kind of acosmist interpre-
tation nevertheless has this going for it: it can explain why Spinoza thought that 
accepting his metaphysical framework would be so transformative – as well as 
why accepting it would be so hard.11
2  The One and the Sameness of Essences
I first want to acknowledge that if one begins with certain views about the one-
and-the-sameness of minds and bodies, then it will seem confused to hold that 
there could be another dimension of one-and-the-sameness in Spinoza’s system 
(viz. the one-and-the-sameness, within an attribute, of an infinite, eternal mode 
and a non-infinite, non-eternal thing).
According to one view, although bodies are only characterized in terms of 
extension and predicates that presuppose extension (e.  g., size, shape, and 
motion) and minds are only characterized in terms of thought and predicates 
that presuppose thought (e.  g., affirmation), a mind and a body are one and the 
same thing if they have all of the same “attribute-neutral” properties: e.  g., if they 
endure for the same amount of time and have the same number of effects and 
causes.12 If one is thinking of one-and-the-sameness this way, then it does seem 
confused to think that an infinite, eternal mode and a non-eternal, non-infinite 
thing could be one and the same thing. After all, it seems there are no neutral 
features through which we can understand the one-and-the-sameness of eternal, 
infinite modes and non-eternal, non-infinite things. The attribute-neutral proper-
ties of enduring for some determinate time or having a certain number of causes 
certainly won’t suffice: eternal, infinite modes never cease to be and have an 
11 I will not focus so much on the cognition involved in accepting Spinoza’s metaphysical 
framework (but see Primus 2017 and forthcoming).
12 See Della Rocca 1996, Jarrett 1991, Newlands 2012, Rice 1999.
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eternal, infinite God as their cause, but enduring, finite things do cease to be and 
do not have an eternal, infinite God as their immanent cause.
Many interpreters have held that Spinoza’s claim that a mind and body are one 
and the same is the claim that they are numerically identical, in fact just one for-
mally real thing conceived in different ways.13 If one is thinking of the one-and-the-
sameness of minds and bodies along these lines, then it will again seem absurd 
to suppose that one and the same thing could be conceived either as eternally, 
infinitely formally real or enduringly, finitely formally real. At any given time, only 
some of the things that will ever be enduringly real are at that time enduringly real, 
whereas at any given time, all the things that will ever be eternally real are eternally 
real. There is an imbalance in the ledger: there are always more eternally formally 
real things than enduringly formally real things. The entities on each side of the 
eternal-durational divide are numerically distinct formally real things, not the same 
formally real things conceived in different ways. Moreover, if only the formal reality 
of eternal, infinite modes is intelligible and real, then the claim that an infinite, 
eternal mode and a finite, enduring thing are one and the same is nonsensical: one 
and the same formally real thing cannot be conceived as either real or not real.
On my proposal, however, the one-and-the-sameness of a mind and a body is 
the one-and-the-sameness of an essence: one and the same essence can be con-
ceived either as real in extension or as real in thought (that is, conceived as a 
representation of the body).14 The one-and-the-sameness of an eternal, infinite 
mode and a non-eternal, non-infinite thing can also be understood as the one-
and-the-sameness of an essence: they are one and the same essence conceived as 
enjoying different flavors of formal reality and as having different causes.
The reading is compatible with necessitarianism: there is just one order of 
essences following from the divine nature. Conceived as formally real sub specie 
durationis, the order is expressed as a transitive causal series of enduring things.15 
13 For critical discussion of this view, as well as citations, see Marshall 2009 and Garrett 2017.
14 I follow Hübner (see 2015 and 2019) in understanding the parallelism of mind and body pri-
marily in terms of the mind’s representation of the body. For another view according to which 
a mind and body are understood as having the same essence, see Morrison (“Spinoza on Mind, 
Body, and Numerical Identity,” ms.). I say more about the one-and-the-sameness within an 
attribute below.
15 The “Physical Digression” after E2p13 might not be a complete treatise on physics, but it does 
indicate how Spinoza thought of transitive causation among bodies. How transitive causal inter-
actions go is determined by the essences of bodies (the specific properties of the involved bodies) 
and by features common to all bodies (what is “equally in the part and whole” (cf. E2p37–39)). 
These features likely include those the Euclidean “common notions” and postulates track, as 
well as laws of motion. I do not think Spinoza holds that the general properties described by 
laws of nature are sempiternal, indefinite entities whose formal reality is over and above the 
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Conceived as formally real sub specie aeternitatis, the order is expressed as an 
immutable order of eternal truths, each eternal truth an eternal, infinite mode 
immanently caused by and inhering in substance.16
2.1  Neutral Essences as Geometrical Essences 
What more can be said about these essences that are attribute- and formal real-
ity-neutral, or can be conceived as either enjoying eternal, infinite reality or 
enduring, finite (or indefinite) reality, and either as enjoying reality in thought or 
reality in extension? I think these attribute- and formal-reality neutral essences 
can be characterized geometrically.17 Although one might think that geometry is 
limited to characterizing what is formally real in extension, it should be noted 
formal reality of finite, non-sempiternal bodies. Such properties are equally in the part (e.  g., any 
finite enduring body) and in the whole (all finite, enduring bodies considered as an indefinite, 
sempiternal individual). Thanks to an anonymous referee for prompting me to say a bit more 
about laws of nature here.
16 I do not wish to imply that to conceive something sub specie durationis is to conceive it wholly 
inadequately: if one has an adequate idea of a property of a body, one can conceive of that property 
as the property of an enduring, finite body (see E5p4). An anonymous referee contended that con-
ception sub specie aeternitatis is equivalent to cognition of things as necessary, or cognition that 
is not from some temporal or spatial vantage point; sub specie aeternitatis conception, according 
to this suggestion, does not require that one conceive of a thing as real as an eternal mode. I will 
not be able to provide a complete response here, but I suspect there are multiple senses of sub 
specie aeternitatis conception discernible in the Ethics, one sense corresponding to cognition of 
the second kind, reason, and the other sense corresponding to cognition of the third kind, scien-
tia intuitiva. An atemporal, non-perspectival apprehension of how certain properties necessitate 
other properties is associated with reason; the transitive causal series of enduring, finite things 
can be conceived not from some indexical present, but sub specie aeternitatis. Granted, this sense 
of sub specie aeternitatis conception does not require that one conceive of anything as real as an 
eternal mode. Yet I think the sense of sub specie aeternitatis conception corresponding to scientia 
intuitiva does require conceiving of the formal reality of things as eternal, infinite modes imma-
nently caused by and inhering in God. See Primus forthcoming for more discussion.
17 Geometric properties and essences may be extension- and thought-neutral, but I admit that 
it is unclear whether a geometrically characterized essence could be conceived in any other 
attribute. I am tempted to agree with Melamed 2013 that there is a representational parallelism 
of thought and each of the infinity of attributes besides extension. If geometry characterizes 
essences that can be conceived under either extension or thought, perhaps schmeometry charac-
terizes essences that can be conceived under either schmextension or thought. The schmeomet-
rically characterizable essences and the geometrically characterizable essences may be one and 
the same essences, but I admit that I am not sure how this one-and-the-sameness is to be under-
stood.
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that the objectively real cubes, triangles, and circles in thought are also charac-
terized geometrically: a representation of a cube is distinguished from the rep-
resentation of other bodies because it represents a cube.18 Geometry is plausibly 
neutral along the eternal-durational dimension as well. Whether cubes, triangles, 
and circles are conceived as enduring and finite bodies or as true and immutable 
natures,19 they are still characterizable in the same geometric terms.20
Granted, this proposal does treat the essences of what is not substance differ-
ently from the attributes, or what “the intellect perceives to be the essence of sub-
stance.” While it may make sense to conceive of a circle as real in thought or real 
in extra-mental extension, as a true and immutable nature or as something finite 
and enduring, it does not make sense to keep an attribute fixed and conceive 
that attribute as enjoying different formal realities. The attribute of extension, for 
example, must be formally real as extension.21
This is, I think, what we should expect: the essence of substance is distinctive 
(see, e.  g., E1p20). Nevertheless, both an attribute and a non-substantial essence 
both satisfy the definition of essence (E2def2). An attribute is that without which 
a substance can neither be nor be conceived, and which can neither be nor be 
conceived without substance. A non-substantial essence is that without which 
a thing  – whether that thing is an infinite, eternal mode or a finite, enduring 
thing – can neither be nor be conceived. The non-substantial essence is also that 
which can neither be nor be conceived without the thing: an essence is always 
18 To say that the attribute-neutral essences are characterized geometrically does not mean that 
there are not other attribute-specific features: an idea conceived qua representational content 
can be characterized geometrically, but the idea conceived qua the activity of thinking some con-
tent will be characterized in attribute-specific terms – e.  g., as affirmation of the geometrically- 
characterized content. I understand the distinction between the “idea” and the “idea of the idea” 
to track these two ways of conceiving of an idea. See Primus 2021.
19 In Primus 2019, I argue that we can understand infinite, eternal modes to be Spinoza’s ver-
sion of what Cartesian true and immutable natures.
20 The idea that geometry is attribute- and formal-reality neutral is no odder than the view that 
a geometer does not need to take a stand on the ontology of mathematical objects to do their job: 
whether a geometer conceives of a cube as real in thought or real in the extramental extended 
world, real as a true and immutable nature or real as something finite and enduring, they can 
prove the very same theorems. Yet one might still object that what is non-spatial – what is in 
thought or what is in eternal, infinite extension, which, following Peterman 2015, may not be 
spatial either – cannot be characterized geometrically. I suspect that Spinoza, perhaps taking 
inspiration from Cartesian analytic geometry, does not take “geometry” so narrowly: one and 
the same thing can be considered in spatial, graphical terms or in non-spatial algebraic terms.
21 I read Spinoza as endorsing ontological pluralism: each attribute specifies a fundamental 
manner of existence. See Garrett 2017 for a sophisticated model of how to understand God, sub-
stance, and the attributes that incorporates such ontological pluralism.
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conceived as enjoying some reality, either as a finite, enduring thing or as an 
eternal truth (where eternal truths enjoy infinite, eternal reality as modes of the 
infinite, eternal substance).22
2.2  Ways to Conceive an Essence
It is worth pausing here to survey the diverse ways a non-substantial essence can 
be conceived; this will begin to clarify how the attribute dimension of the system 
intersects with the formal-reality dimension of the system.
Consider an essence that plays a prominent role in the Ethics, the essence of a 
human body, a particular ratio of constituent parts in motion and rest (E2lemma5). 
Conceived under the attribute of extension, the essence enjoys formal reality 
outside of thought: this is the formally real human body. However, there are two 
ways the essence can be conceived to be formally real outside of thought. There is 
the finite, enduring human body: this is the essence of the human body enjoying 
non-infinite, non-eternal formal reality. The human body, as well as each of its 
constituent parts, is a finite, enduring extended thing striving to persevere in its 
finite, enduring formal reality (E3p7); the essence of the human body is conceived 
as persisting over time despite changes in its constituent parts (E2lemmas 4–7). 
The finite, enduring human body (and its constituent parts) come (and cease) to 
be by the transitive causal activity of other finite, enduring bodies (E1p28).
And there is the body conceived to be an infinite, eternal mode of the infinite, 
eternal extended substance (below I try to dispel the sense that it is absurd to 
suppose that the essence of the body could be conceived to be real as an infinite, 
eternal mode). Infinite, eternal reality is not divisible into parts; the ratio here is 
not conceived as a pattern that persists through changes in enduring finite parts 
of a body, but is instead conceived as an eternal truth. The infinite, eternal body, 
22 See footnote 23 below. Here one could wonder (and an anonymous referee did wonder) how 
kind essences (e.  g., man, human being) fit into my account. This deserves more discussion than 
I can give it here, but here are a few remarks. The essences of particular human beings are, 
conceived under the attribute of extension, essences of particular bodies. If the same set of prop-
erties of extension is part of each one of these essences, then that set of properties is the kind 
essence human body. Any finite, enduring human body can be conceived either in terms of its 
individuating essence (what makes it the very body it is and not another body), or in terms of 
the kind essence (what makes the body a human body). So, there is a sense in which one and the 
same kind essence can be conceived either as an infinite, eternal mode or as an enduring, finite 
thing, although when it is conceived in the latter way, it is not, strictly speaking, some specific 
finite, enduring human body, but just a finite, enduring body only insofar as it is a human body. 
See Hübner 2016 for a recent discussion of kind essences.
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like all infinite, eternal modes (E1p21–23), is immanently caused by and inheres 
in the infinite, eternal extended substance.
The same essence can be conceived under the attribute of thought as objec-
tively real, as representing a formally real human body.23 This is one way of con-
ceiving the human mind (E2p13). However, there are two ways the essence can 
be conceived to be objectively real in thought. There is the objectively real finite, 
enduring body, or the representation of the finite, enduring body as formally real 
in extension and as a body coming to be from the transitive causal activity of other 
finite, enduring bodies, and the objectively real infinite, eternal body, or the rep-
resentation of the infinite, eternal body as formally real in extension and a mode 
immanently caused by and inhering in the infinite, eternal extended substance.24
Conceived under the attribute of thought as formally real, the essence is not 
an idea or representation of the body, but an idea of the idea of the body. What 
Spinoza means by the “idea of the idea” (E2p21) is obscure, but I take one of Spi-
noza’s points to be that we can conceive of the mind either as a representation (the 
objectively real body) or as the activity of thinking that representation.25 Here too 
there is a distinction to be made. There is the human mind conceived as the act 
of thinking about the finite, enduring human body: the representational content 
(the objectively real finite, enduring human body) and the formally real act of 
thinking that content are one and the same thing conceived within the attribute 
23 One might object that the idea of the essence of the human body might not be an idea of the 
formally real human body. Since existence is not part of non-substantial essences, it seems one 
can have an adequate idea of the essence of a non-substance without having an idea of that 
essence as existing, or as enjoying formal reality. I acknowledge that existence is not part of any 
(non-substantial) essence, and I think Spinoza would agree that one can decouple an actual, 
striving body’s essence from finite, enduring reality and conceive the body’s essence apart from 
any enduring, finite reality. But I think this is compatible with the view that an adequate idea 
of the “decoupled” essence is nevertheless the idea of something enjoying reality – viz., eter-
nal, infinite reality, the reality of a mode necessarily caused by and inhering in the one eternal, 
infinite substance (however, whether one understands that the (eternal) reality of this decoupled 
essence is the reality of a mode of God depends on whether one has the right conception of God 
and God’s causation of things). See “Spinoza’s Monism I,” Section 2, and Primus forthcoming.
24 Here one might agree that there is an idea of the essence as enjoying eternal, infinite formal 
reality in extension but resist holding that such an idea is an idea of the human body, instead 
insisting that an idea of the human body must be an idea of an enduring, finite, and actual 
human body. I concede that this idea of the body is not an idea of the body as it is ordinarily 
conceived: it is axiomatic that “we feel a certain body” to be affected (E2a4), and the body that is 
felt is a finite, enduring thing. Yet I do not think we need to deny that an essence given sub specie 
aeternitatis in extension is also the human body or that an idea of this given essence is an idea 
of the human body (see E5p22–23).
25 See Primus 2021.
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of thought. And there is the human mind conceived as the act of thinking about 
the body as something with infinite and eternal formal reality: the objectively 
real representational content (the objectively real infinite, eternal human body) 
and the formally real act of thinking that content are one and the same thing con-
ceived within the attribute of thought. Put another way, if what is thought about 
is finite and enduring, then the act of thinking itself is formally real as something 
finite and enduring; a finite, enduring thought comes to be (and ceases to be) 
by the transitive causal activity of other finite, enduring thoughts.26 If what is 
thought about is infinite and eternal, then the act of thinking itself is formally 
real as something infinite and eternal, and is immanently caused by the infinite, 
eternal substance (conceived under the attribute of thought).27 
2.3  An Objection
One might object that the essences of some things (e.  g., cubes) are such that 
when they enjoy formal reality, they must enjoy finite formal reality, while the 
essences of other things (e.  g., the “infinite individual” of E2lemma7s) are such 
that when they enjoy formal reality, they must enjoy infinite formal reality. If this 
is the case, however, then it is not a universal truth that one and the same essence 
can be conceived either as enjoying finite formal reality or infinite formal reality. 
A cube can only be conceived as something finite. The infinite individual can only 
be conceived as something infinite.
I agree that there is a difference between the cube and the individual 
described in E2lemma7s. And I agree that an essence determines whether, when 
26 In a human mind, many, if not most, representations of enduring bodies will be inadequate. 
For one thing, each such body has an infinity of causes; a finite mind does not have the capacity 
to cognize all the causes necessitating the coming to be of a thing, and so the idea, conceived as a 
representation of the particular body, will be a confused representation of the body. Furthermore, 
an explanation of why some human mind comes to have an idea of a particular enduring body 
at a particular time may also be extraordinarily complex. A human body is at any time causally 
affected by an infinity of other bodies, but only some representations of bodily affections rise to the 
level of conscious awareness; a full account of why a mind is aware of some things and not others, 
or why some ideas are stronger or more powerful than others, may involve an infinity of factors.
27 The act of thinking in this latter case is adequate cognition, an act of understanding. That 
understanding something eternal and infinite (e.  g., God’s nature) means that one’s own mind is 
also something eternal is, I think, a central claim in Ethics Part V (see especially E5p23d, E5p29–31). 
The more a mind can understand eternal things, the more the mind is eternal and the more its 
activity is God’s own activity of understanding (see E5p33, E5p36, E5p39). See Primus forthcoming.
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the thing enjoys enduring formal reality, it is a thing limited by other things (like 
a cube) or is something that is not limited by anything else (like the individual). 
A finite, enduring cube would not be a cube if it were not spatially limited: to be 
a cube, there must be extended reality beyond the cube’s bounds that is not the 
cube’s own extended reality. And the sempiternal, indefinitely extensible individ-
ual would not be what it is if it were not spatially unlimited: to be the individual 
it is, it must be the case that any extended reality beyond any imposed spatial 
bound is still the individual’s own reality. 
However, I wish to note that I think there are, in Spinoza’s system, two ways 
to not be a finite thing. The enduring, sempiternal individual is non-finite in the 
sense that it is indefinite, and its reality can still be thought of as composed of 
finite parts. But there is also what is non-finite because it is infinite in the non-in-
definite sense: while Descartes thought that only God’s reality is properly infinite, 
Spinoza can be understood as holding not just that God has modes, but also that 
each of these modes can also be understood as infinite in the non-indefinite 
sense. The essence of the cube and the essence of the individual (or any other 
essence) can both be conceived to enjoy infinite formal reality.
To understand what this means, first consider what it is for the divine essence 
to enjoy infinite formal reality. Being infinite is an “absolute affirmation of the 
existence of some nature” (E1p8s1, my emphasis). The divine essence extension 
is (by nature) formally real and is not lacking in the formal reality department: 
there is no “amount” of (eternal) formal reality that extension could have but 
does not in fact have – indeed, to think of the reality in gradable “amount” terms 
is to misapprehend it. For extension to be an essence of substance, it must enjoy 
infinite and eternal reality. 
Now take the essence cube. This essence can be conceived as finite. When 
cube is conceived as an actual, enduring thing that is real outside of thought, it 
can be thought of as lacking some reality that it is consistent with its nature to 
have: the cube would still be a cube if it were bigger than it in fact is or endured 
for longer than it in fact does. 
This essence can also be conceived as something eternal, as a true and 
immutable nature. I think it is plausible to suppose that cube, conceived as a true 
and immutable nature, is infinite in the sense that it, like extension, cannot be 
conceived as lacking some formal reality that it could have. A true and immut-
able nature cannot be conceived as less (or more) eternal than it is; there is no 
“amount” of (eternal) formal reality that cube, conceived in this way, could have 
but does not in fact have.
Granted, the essence cube is not the essence triangle, so there is a sense in 
which one can always deny something of cube and affirm that it is not something. 
Spinoza says that “being finite is really, in part, a negation” (E1p8s1), but I do not 
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think that denying that the essential properties of a triangle belong to the essence 
of a cube is a “negation” that makes the cube finite: this negation has to do with 
the essence, not the existence or formal reality the essence enjoys.28 To be finite is 
to deny existence to a nature (E1p8s1). 
Furthermore, while one essence may determine other essences (e.  g., the 
essence triangle determines the essence scalene triangle), the determination of 
one true and immutable nature by another true and immutable nature is a deter-
mination of essences, of properties by properties, not of the reality those essences 
or properties enjoy. One true and immutable nature does not make any other true 
and immutable nature more or less real than it is.29
One might point out that an eternal cube is not a substance, so there is a 
sense in which an eternal cube does lack reality. Yet I do not think this sort of 
negation means that the cube is finite either. A finite cube’s reality is limited by 
the reality of other finite things: there is some reality that the cube could have 
but, because of these other things, does not have (i.  e., it is because of these other 
things that the cube was destroyed at a certain time or that it was one size rather 
than another size). But an eternal cube would not be a cube if it were substance; 
in this case, there is not some eternal reality that the cube could have but does 
not have. 
The essence cube can be conceived as an infinite and eternal mode. The same 
goes for the essence of the human body, the essence of a human mind,30 and the 
essence of the “infinite individual.” When the essence of the “infinite individual” 
is conceived sub specie aeternitatis, its reality cannot be thought of as composed 
of parts, as indefinitely divisible, or as always extending beyond any bound. Sub 
specie aeternitatis, the individual’s reality is, like the reality of other essences 
conceived sub specie aeternitatis, infinite.
Spinoza equates reality and perfection (E2def6). Finite (and indefinite) 
reality is gradable: it seems some enduring things are more perfect – more real – 
28 Extension is not thought, so in this same sense, an attribute is not something (however, the 
same cannot be said of God, which can be conceived under an infinity of attributes).
29 See E5p40s. There may be some essences E (square circles) that are impossible given other 
essences F and G (squares and circles), but it is inapt to conceive of these E-essences as possibly 
real modes that are precluded from having eternal, infinite reality by F- and G-essences; rather, 
E-essences are not possibly real. Whether the essence of, say, a unicorn should be placed in the 
same category as E-essences is not a topic I can take up here.
30 In E5p40s, Spinoza claims that the human mind “insofar as it understands, is an eternal 
mode of thinking, which is determined by another eternal mode of thinking, and this again by 
another, and so on.” Given that Spinoza cites E1p21 – a proposition about infinite and eternal 
modes – as helping to establish this claim, I think that the eternal modes discussed here are 
infinite as well.
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than others, with the “infinite individual” the most real or perfect of all.31 On 
the proposal I have presented here, it will turn out that even this most real, most 
perfect enduring thing cannot be caused by the infinite, eternal substance; even 
this most real enduring thing is, in the end, not really real. However, the essence 
of the individual can be conceived as an infinite, eternal mode whose infinite, 
eternal reality is immanently caused by substance. And so conceived, the indi-
vidual is not more real or more perfect than any other essence: all essences are 
infinite, eternal modes.32
3  Some Textual Objections
One might object that my interpretation does not hew closely enough to important 
texts. A passage from Letter 12 is sometimes taken as evidence that for Spinoza, 
substance is the only thing that can be understood as eternally real: 
“we conceive the existence of substance as of an entirely different kind from the existence of 
modes. This is the source of the difference between eternity and duration. It is to the exist-
ence of modes alone that we can apply the term duration […].” (G IV 54  f.)
Here Spinoza seems to say that 1) substance is the one and only thing that can 
be eternal, and 2) modes are the only things to which we can “apply the term 
duration,” so 3) the existence of substance is of an entirely different kind from 
the existence of modes because substance is solely eternal and modes are solely 
enduring.33
Yet there is another way of reading this text: 1) substance can only be con-
ceived as eternally formally real, but 2) we can “apply the term duration” as well 
as the term eternity to that which is not substance, so 3) the existence of sub-
stance is of an entirely different kind from the existence of modes. This way of 
31 In E5p40, Spinoza ties perfection and reality to activity. Any finite thing both acts and is acted 
on; the indefinite individual composed of all finite things is not acted on.
32 Descartes held that bracketing what ideas represent, all ideas, as modes of a thinking sub-
stance, are on ontological par (see AT VII.40). Spinoza extends this point in a new way: there is 
parity of the formal reality of ideas sub specie aeternitatis. But there is not just parity of the reality 
of ideas, as modes conceived under the attribute of extension are also on par. While the onto-
logical parity of things conceived as infinite, eternal modes can be known with certainty, there 
is not such knowledge of the parity of the (ultimately ersatz) reality of indefinite, enduringly real 
things: it is not necessary that “things which cannot be adequately expressed by any number” 
are equal (G IV 61).
33 Schmaltz 2015 and Melamed forthcoming.
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taking this text accords with my proposal: substance’s essence can only be con-
ceived as eternal and infinite, but modes’ essences can be conceived as either 
eternal or as enduring.34
A more sweeping objection is that the proposal conflicts with positions it is 
simply obvious Spinoza presents in Part I of the Ethics. According to the stand-
ard reading of Part  I of the Ethics, the “infinite modes” are a proper subset of 
modes.35 Spinoza discusses the modes whose existence is infinite (E1p21–23) and 
then turns to other modes whose existence is finite (E1p28). There is, in short, a 
partition: some of an infinite, eternal substance’s effects are infinite and eternal 
(and/or sempiternal), while the rest are finite and non-eternal. On the interpreta-
tion I have suggested here, there is no such partition: strictly speaking, all modes 
of an infinite, eternal substance are infinite, eternal modes. Whatever is finite (or 
indefinite) and enduringly real cannot be immanently caused by – or coherently 
conceived as inhering in – the infinite and eternal substance. 
I do not think it is at all obvious that the text must be understood along the 
lines of the standard reading. E1p21–23 can even be understood as establishing 
that everything caused by the infinite, eternal substance must have eternal (not 
merely sempiternal) and infinite (not merely indefinite) reality.36 Spinoza does 
shift the discussion to enduring, finite things by E1p28. But instead of taking this 
shift to indicate that Spinoza has moved from discussing the set of an infinite, 
eternal substance’s effects comprised of infinite modes to the (disjoint) set com-
prised of finite modes, we can instead take the shift to indicate that Spinoza 
has moved from discussing essences conceived as enjoying eternal and infinite 
formal reality to those same essences conceived as enjoying enduring and finite 
(or indefinite) formal reality. In what follows, I sketch my alternative to the stand-
ard account of some of the main moves of Ethics Part I. 
Spinoza begins his Ethics by arguing for a proper conception of substance 
and God: God is the one eternal, infinite (and not merely indefinite), necessarily 
existing substance that can be conceived under different attributes (to E1p14). 
The next major move is to argue that given what God is, God’s effects must be 
an infinity of modes necessarily following from, and caused by, God’s (neces-
sarily existing) nature (E1p15–18). The stretch of text from E1p19–23 establishes 
further conclusions about these effects. Because, under any attribute, substance 
34 Elsewhere in Letter 12, Spinoza talks of duration “flowing” from eternal things (G IV.56). This 
is, admittedly, suggestive of eternal-durational causation. Whether Spinoza’s discussion of the 
varieties of infinity meshes with my proposal is a question I will address elsewhere.
35 See, for example, entries in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Newlands 2018a, Shein 
2018.
36 For a detailed defense and reconstructions, see Primus 2019.
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is eternal (E1p19) and God’s essence and (eternal, infinite) existence are one 
and the same (E1p20), the propria following with necessity from God’s essence 
(E1p16) will have eternal and infinite existence as well (E1p21–23). God’s effects 
are modifications of existence itself, insofar as it follows from the definition of the 
eternal thing (E1def8): God’s existence and essence are conceived as an eternal 
truth (E1def8, E1p20c1), and so the infinity of what follows with necessity from 
the divine essence (E1p16) are also all eternal truths. So, it is not just that every 
one of God’s effects is a mode – it is also the case that every one of God’s effects 
has, as a mode in and caused by eternal and infinite substance, eternal and 
infinite reality (cf. E5p30d).
E1p24, “the essence of things produced by God does not involve existence,” is 
an important reminder. I take it that the “things produced by God” are the entities 
Spinoza has just discussed in E1p21–23; Spinoza clarifies here that the essences 
of God’s modes do not involve existence. If their essences did involve existence, 
they would, by E1def1, be self-caused, existing “only from the necessity of [their] 
nature[s]”; anything that is produced (i.  e., caused) by God is not self-caused.37 If 
one takes a thing produced by God and considers the essence on its own, one will 
find that the essence does not involve existence.
Take the true and immutable nature of a triangle. If we consider the essence 
on its own, attending to just the properties that make the triangle a triangle and 
not something else, we will realize that the triangle does not exist by the necessity 
of its nature, but by the necessity of its cause. In the corollary, Spinoza under-
scores that it is not just that we see that the triangle does not exist, by its nature, 
as something eternal, infinite, and necessary; we also see that there is nothing in 
the triangle’s essence that specifies anything about the triangle coming to exist in 
time or enduring for any period of time. It thus follows that – “to use a Scholastic 
term” – God is the cause of the very being of things [Deum esse causam essendi 
rerum] (E1p24c).
Yet in the corollary Spinoza also seems to assert exactly what I have argued 
he denies: namely, that God, the one and only eternal, infinite, self-causing sub-
stance, is the cause of the reality of things conceived as enduring in time: “God 
is not only the cause of things’ beginning to exist [incipiant existere], but also of 
their persevering in existing [in existendo perseverent].” 
We can read E1p24c as Spinoza’s assertion that the account of the immanent 
causation of modes he has just supplied in E1p21–23 is an account of how God, 
conceived as the infinite, eternal substance, causes the very being of things  – 
37 That is, what is produced by God are not substances. Cf. E1p6, “one substance cannot be 
produced by another substance” (my emphasis).
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here infinite, eternal modes. But it is also possible that E1p24c is the beginning of 
a shift to a discussion of enduring, finite things: the essences of enduring, finite 
things do not include existence either, so if they enjoy enduring, finite reality, 
they must have been caused to have that reality. Is there a sense in which God is 
that cause?
No and a (qualified) yes. As we know from E1p15s, there is the intellectual 
conception of an attribute, e.  g., extension, as substance. If we conceive of exten-
sion as substance, then it is infinite and eternal, and is the sustaining cause of 
infinite, eternal modes. Being infinite is, as I discussed in the last section, an 
absolute affirmation of the existence of some nature (E1p8s1); E1p21–23 concern 
what follows from, or is caused by, the divine nature when the divine nature is 
conceived in this absolute way, as infinite (and eternal). In the strict sense, God, 
conceived as, e.  g., infinite and eternal extended substance, is not the cause of 
any enduring, finite body. 
But the answer could also be a qualified yes. One can think of extension not 
as enjoying infinite, eternal formal reality, but as enjoying indefinite, enduring 
formal reality. This is the imaginative way of thinking about extension: on this 
way of taking extended reality, it will be “found to be finite, divisible, and com-
posed of parts” (E1p15s). In E1p24c, Spinoza could be indicating that an attribute 
of God, taken in this imaginative way, is – in a sense to be specified – a cause of 
the coming to be and continued endurance of things.
This could be where Spinoza is headed. As we will see in E1p28, things with 
“finite and determinate existence” follow from or are “determined to exist and 
produce an effect by God or an attribute of God insofar as it is modified by a modi-
fication which is finite and has a determinate existence” (E1p28d). The cause of 
the coming to be and continued endurance of things with “finite and determinate 
existence” are things with “finite and determinate existence”; such things are not 
modes of God, the infinite, eternal substance, but are modifications of an endur-
ing, divisible, sempiternal extended substratum. I return to E1p28 below. 
In E1p25, Spinoza argues that the existence and essence of things are caused 
by God. All essences  – “everything which can fall under an infinite intellect” 
(E1p16c1) – follow with necessity from the divine nature (E1p16): in causing his 
own nature to exist as an infinite, eternal substance, God thereby causes all 
essences following from that nature to exist as infinite, eternal modes. “God must 
be the cause of all things in the same sense in which he is called the cause of 
himself” (E1p25s).38
38 But this does not mean that substance’s self-causing essence pertains to a thing’s essence 
(E2p10s).
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Yet E1p25c seems contrary to my interpretation: “particular things are nothing 
but affections of God’s attributes, that is, modes by which God’s attributes are 
expressed in a certain and determinate way.” The demonstration, Spinoza says, 
is evident from E1d5, “by mode I understand the affections of substance,” and 
E1p15, “whatever is, is in God, and nothing can be or be conceived without God.” 
The next time Spinoza uses “particular things [res particulares]” is E2p31, when it 
is clear that he is talking about enduring, finite things (“we can have an entirely 
inadequate cognition of the duration of the singular things which are outside 
us”). This suggests that when he says “particular things” in E1p25c, he does have 
finite, enduring things in mind and is asserting that such things are modes imma-
nently caused by God. 
Here is how I take E1p25c. In this argumentative context, the statement that 
particular things are modes will be a highly jarring claim. Spinoza has (at least as 
I read him) just argued that all modes of God must be eternal and infinite (E1p21–
23). Yet E1p24 and E1p25 enable us to understand how the tension is to be relieved. 
According to E1p25, God is the cause of the essences of all things; the essence of 
any particular thing must be one of the infinity of essences following from the 
divine nature (E1p16). The essences of non-divine things do not involve any exist-
ence (E1p24), whether infinite and eternal or finite and enduring, so the essence 
of any particular thing can be conceived as enjoying infinite, eternal formal reality 
rather than finite, enduring formal reality. When the thing’s essence is conceived 
as enjoying infinite, eternal reality, it is a mode of the infinite, eternal substance; 
as we know from E1p15, “whatever is, is in God, and nothing can be conceived 
without God.” Take any enduring, finite thing: it is in and conceived through the 
infinite, eternal substance – it is just not in and conceived through the infinite, 
eternal substance qua an essence thought of as enjoying enduring, finite reality. 
What properties a thing has determines how it interfaces with other things. 
E1p26 and E1p27 can be understood as making the point that because God is the 
cause of the essences of all things (E1p25), God is the cause of these determina-
tions, since what properties a thing has is determined by its own essence and the 
essences of other things. “A thing which has been determined to produce an effect 
has necessarily been determined this way by God; and one which has not been 
determined by God cannot determine itself to produce an effect” (E1p26), and “a 
thing which has been determined by God to produce an effect cannot render itself 
undetermined” (E1p27). 
E1p28 can be read as making explicit that if an essence is conceived, under 
some attribute, to be formally real in the way finite, enduring things are real, then 
it must be (transitively) caused and determined by other finite, enduring things – 
and not caused, either immediately (by E1p21) or mediately (by E1p22), by the 
infinite, eternal substance.
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In E1p28s, Spinoza offers what looks like an important summary. The text is, 
however, highly obscure:
Since certain things had to be produced by God immediately, namely, those which follow 
necessarily from his absolute nature, and others (which nevertheless can neither be nor be 
conceived without God) had to be produced by the mediation of these first things, it follows: 
I. That God is absolutely the proximate cause of the things produced immediately by 
him, and not in his own kind, as they say. For God’s effects can neither be nor be con-
ceived without their cause (by E1p15 and E1p24c).
II. That God cannot properly be called the remote cause of singular things, except perhaps 
so that we may distinguish them from those things that he has produced immediately, 
or rather, that follow from his absolute nature. For by a remote cause we understand 
one which is not conjoined in any way with its effect. But all things that are, are in God, 
and so depend on God that they can neither be nor be conceived without him.
The text does admit of different readings.39 Yet I think it can be read in a way 
that (mostly) accords with what I have suggested in this essay. Spinoza begins 
by referring to things “produced by God immediately [a Deo immediate produci], 
namely, those which follow necessarily from his absolute nature.” While the use 
of ‘immediately’ might lead one to think that Spinoza is referring only to the enti-
ties described in E1p21, he could be referring to all the entities following either 
directly or indirectly from God’s “absolute nature.” When an attribute is con-
ceived as the infinite, eternal substance, everything that substance causes is an 
infinite, eternal mode.
It follows from this that an infinite, eternal God’s production, or causation, 
of the formal reality of God’s modes is as immediate – as unmediated – as can be. 
There is no intervening reality between the reality of substance and the reality of 
its modes: as an immanent cause, God is absolutely the proximate cause of the 
being of all things.40 This is not causation in his own kind, in the sense that God is 
not causing other substances. A substance, according to Spinoza, has its reality in 
virtue of its essence, or is a causa sui, whereas modes have their reality in virtue 
of being caused to have that reality. 
In the first lines of the scholium, Spinoza contrasts the things produced imme-
diately with “other things” that had to be produced by means of, or by the mediation 
of (mediantibus), these immediately produced modes. I take these “other things” 
to be the things described in E1p28.41 I grant that the claim that the things of E1p28 
39 See Giancotti 1991 for a survey of options.
40 I take Spinoza’s citation of E1p24c to imply that divine sustaining causation is under discus-
sion in this stretch of E1p28s.
41 See Gueroult 1968, 342, and Curley 1969, 70  f.
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are produced by God by means of the entities discussed in E1p21–23 does not fit 
with the interpretation I have offered here. I have argued that there is not a causal 
interface between enduring, finite things and the infinite, eternal substance; this 
passage suggests that the entities of E1p21–23 do serve as some sort of causal inter-
mediary (perhaps by being sempiternal features of the enduring world). 
I think it is worth noting, however, that as far as I can tell, Spinoza does not 
say more about such mediation elsewhere in the Ethics. E1p21–23 are not cited 
in discussions of how enduring, finite things are causally related to an infinite, 
eternal substance. These propositions are instead employed when Spinoza con-
trasts enduring, finite things (e.  g., actual, enduring human bodies) and infinite, 
eternal modes (see E2p11d, E2p30d, E4p4d), or says that the human mind, insofar 
as it understands, “is an eternal mode of thinking” (E5p40s). 
Setting aside the awkwardness of the “mediation” claim, we can, I think, 
understand the last part of the scholium as follows. The infinite, eternal substance 
is not properly called the remote cause of singular (enduring, finite) things: the 
essences of all things enjoy reality as infinite, eternal modes caused by the infinite, 
eternal substance. When the same essences are conceived as enjoying enduring 
and finite reality, then they are singular things caused by other singular things; so 
conceived, an infinite, eternal God will seem like a “remote cause” that is not “con-
joined in any way with its effect.” Any enduring, finite thing is not, qua enduring, 
finite thing, in the infinite, eternal substance, but it – its essence – is in the infinite, 
eternal substance as an infinite, eternal mode: “all things that are, are in God, and 
so depend on God that they can neither be nor be conceived without him.”
4  Acosmism
Curley famously observed that it seems like Spinoza would be making a category 
mistake if he held that actual, concrete things are modes inhering in substance.42 
I think Curley was onto something here. As I have suggested, we need not assume 
that finite, enduring things are, as finite, enduring things, modes whose reality 
is the eternal, infinite substance’s reality modified, or are things that are in an 
eternal, infinite substance as properties are in a thing.43 Indeed, I think Spinoza 
42 Curley 1969, 18; cf. Curley 1988, 31. Curley allows that Spinoza’s infinite, eternal God is a 
necessary (albeit not sufficient) cause of finite, enduring things (see “Spinoza’s Monism I,” Sec-
tion 1).
43 Cf. Renz, who provides different arguments for the conclusion that finite individuals are not 
modes inhering in or deducible from God (Renz 2018, 44, 67, 262)
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could concede that others, including Cartesians, are not entirely off-base in 
holding that an infinite, eternal God is transcendent: Spinoza could agree with 
such interlocutors that an infinite, eternal God is properly conceived as some-
thing apart from finite, enduring things.
But, as I have also suggested, we can still think Spinoza is committed to 
everything being a mode inhering in substance, where a mode is a way that 
the infinite, eternal reality of substance is: the essences of all things are real as 
infinite, eternal modes inhering in and immanently caused by the infinite, eternal 
substance. We can hold that in coming to know necessary properties of a body or 
a mind, we are coming to know divine propria.44 
Note that if we read Spinoza as I have suggested, then Spinoza can be under-
stood as simply sidestepping a major debate that occupied the attention of many 
medieval and early modern thinkers. That debate concerned how to balance 
God’s causal activity in the world – including God’s sustaining activity of the very 
being of things, God’s activity secundum esse – with finite, enduring things’ pro-
ductive activity secundum fieri.45 On my interpretation, Spinoza held that finite, 
enduring things’ transitive causation does not interface at all with the activity of 
an infinite, eternal God: just as it is confused to hold that minds causally interact 
with bodies, it is confused to hold that an infinite, eternal God creates or is other-
wise involved in the goings-on of an enduring world. The project of explaining the 
coming to be of an enduring, finite thing needs to be sequestered from the project 
of explaining the very being of things as caused by an infinite, eternal God.
Yet on this account, once one engages in the latter project after having 
observed the “proper order of philosophizing” (E2p10s) and after having come to 
the right (Spinozan) conception of God and divine causation, it seems one has to 
acknowledge that enduring, finite things figuring in the former project are not, in 
fact, genuinely real. One will understand that although the essences of enduring, 
finite things are intelligible,46 their non-eternal, non-infinite reality is not. Such 
44 There is an enormous literature on inherence, causation, and predication in Spinoza. For the 
view that modes inhere in and are caused by substance, but that predication is not fundamental 
in Spinoza’s thinking about inherence, see Carriero 1995 (especially 246 n4 and 262  f. n38). For 
the view that both causation and inherence can be analyzed in terms of conceptual relations, see 
Newlands 2010 and 2018. For a recent critical discussion of Curley’s interpretation, see Melamed 
2013, 3–60, and Lin 2019, ch. 5.
45 See Freddoso 1991 and 1994 for an overview and a discussion of various strategies for maxi-
mizing God’s causal involvement while allowing creatures to have some genuine causal efficacy.
46 I suggested above that these essences can be characterized geometrically: if geometry is intel-
ligible, then these essences will be too. In this essay, I have assumed that Spinoza is entitled 
to there being an infinity of non-divine, geometrically-characterizable essences, but one could 
legitimately wonder whether a plurality of distinct essences is, in the end, unintelligible as well 
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reality cannot be coherently conceived as caused by God, and what is not caused 
by God is not real, as all there is is the one infinite, eternal substance and its 
modes. The tangible, concrete formal reality one has always felt one’s own body 
and affecting bodies to have (E2a4) – reality that had hitherto likely been taken to 
be absolutely, undeniably real – turns out to be ersatz reality.
The thread I have followed through Spinoza’s system thus leads to acosmism, 
albeit an acosmism only about enduring, finite reality.47 God causes the very 
being of the world, but the world that is sustained is not the changing world of 
finite things interacting with other finite things in time, but an immutable world 
of eternal, infinite modes in an eternal, infinite substance.48
The interpretation privileges the intelligibility of an infinite, eternal God and 
God’s causation of things. What is left unexplained is why any essence is con-
ceived as an enduring, finite thing transitively caused by other enduring, finite 
things in the first place. We have part of an explanation. A finite, enduring body 
can be conceived under the attribute of thought as a representation of the finite, 
enduring body; as I suggested in Section 2.3, if what is represented is finite and 
enduring, then the act of thinking itself is formally real as something finite and 
enduring. So that a mind can conceive of things as enjoying enduring, finite 
formal reality hinges on the body enjoying enduring, finite formal reality.
But this, of course, just presupposes that a body is conceived as formally 
real as an enduring, finite thing. The problem is that the body enjoying endur-
ing, finite formal reality is not really real; that essences are conceived as enjoy-
ing enduring and finite formal reality is a fact, but, to echo Joachim, “a fact for 
(see Della Rocca 2012). I have also assumed that Spinoza is entitled to assert a plurality of attrib-
utes. For some classic arguments that Spinoza is in fact committed to the attribute of thought 
being the only genuine attribute, see Pollock 1880, Martineau 1882, and Joachim 1901. For argu-
ments that a Spinozan commitment to intelligibility leads to a denial of the reality of relations, 
including the representation relation between thought and extension and the constitution rela-
tion between an attribute and substance, see Della Rocca 2006.
47 Cf. Della Rocca 2008a, 50–52, and Caird 1888, 281. Youpa also claims that “durational exist-
ence is not real in the same sense as an eternal existence” and is “an inferior kind of existence,” 
since “existence in the strict sense is eternal existence” (Youpa 2011, 310). Yet Youpa resists the 
acosmist conclusion, arguing that singular things partake, in varying degrees, in eternal exist-
ence (where a thing that produces more effects partakes more in eternal existence). For a helpful 
overview of various other “acosmist” and “idealist” interpretations of Spinoza, see Newlands 
2011a and 2011b.
48 Hegel also argued for an acosmist reading of Spinoza, according to which “all this that we 
know as the world” is denied; there is “no such thing as finite reality” (Hegel 1995, 281). On my 
reading, although finite, enduring things are not real, their essences enjoy infinite, eternal real-
ity in God, and so are as real as anything that is not substance itself can be.
 Spinoza’s Monism II: A Proposal   23
which no place can be found in Spinoza’s conception of the ultimate nature of 
things.”49
This is a serious issue. To avoid attributing an acosmist view to Spinoza, one 
could challenge one or more of my interpretation’s starting points. For example, 
I have assumed that substance’s reality is timelessly eternal and infinite, but one 
could instead try to argue that substance’s reality is not to be understood as time-
lessly eternal or infinite, but as a sempiternal and indefinite (where being indef-
inite here does not imply actual divisibility).50 Or perhaps substance’s formal 
reality is just a more generic existence that is not itself infinite and timelessly 
eternal but is such that it causes itself to have two kinds of modifications, infinite 
and timelessly eternal ones or finite (or indefinite), enduring ones. Or, if one wants 
to retain a view of substance’s reality as timelessly eternal and infinite, one could 
challenge the contention that Spinoza set such a high bar for the intelligibility of 
divine causation, or else explain how an infinite and eternal substance’s imma-
nent causation of enduring, sempiternal formal reality (with a transitive causal 
structure) is, despite the considerations I pointed to in “Spinoza’s Monism I,”51 
intelligible after all.
Despite the difficulties attending the acosmist interpretation I have presented 
here, I think the interpretation nevertheless accords with the main claim of Ethics 
Part V: namely, that understanding the metaphysical system Spinoza presents 
in the Ethics is affectively transformative.52 Affects are “affections of the body by 
which the body’s power of acting is increased or diminished, aided or restrained, 
and at the same time, the ideas of these affections” (E3def3). Insofar as one 
thinks of oneself and other things as enduring and finite, one will think there is 
some basis for affects: so conceived, other things do diminish or increase one’s 
enduring, finite reality and power. But once one comes to a proper understand-
ing of metaphysics, one understands God and God’s relation to things, and one 
realizes that what an eternal, infinite God sustains – what is genuinely real – is 
not a world of enduring, finite minds and bodies, but rather a world of essences 
enjoying reality as infinite, eternal modes, which can be conceived under differ-
ent attributes. Once one understands that one’s own body (or mind) is real as an 
infinite, eternal mode, one recognizes that its reality is not such that it can be 
49 Joachim 1901, 112.
50 The analogy between substance and water in E1p15s could be taken to imply that corporeal 
substance is sempiternal and indefinitely extensible (and divisible, at least in thought).
51 See also the reconstructions of propositions E1p21–23 in Primus 2019.
52 It is one thing to understand (and affirm, by E2p49) the metaphysical system via reasoning 
through the Ethics, it is another thing to understand and affirm the nature of God and things by 
the flash of insight that is scientia intuitiva (see Primus forthcoming).
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impinged upon by other things or prevented by other things from having reality 
it could have.53 One sees, that is, that one’s reality is not affected or destroyed 
by other things, since infinite, eternal modes neither diminish nor enhance each 
other’s infinite, eternal formal reality. It seems plausible, at least to me, that if one 
can conceive of oneself and things in this way, then one will be “hardly troubled 
in spirit” and enjoy “true peace of mind” (E5p42s).54,55
AT Descartes, Œuvres de Descartes. Eds. Ch. Adam/P. Tannery, 1964–74.  
‘AT VII.41  f.’ stands for volume VII, pages 41 to 42
CM Spinoza, Cogitata Metaphysica
E Spinoza, Ethics; ‘E1p15’ stands for Ethics, part one, proposition 15
Ep Spinoza, Letters
G Spinoza, Spinoza Opera (4 vols.). Ed. by C. Gebhardt. Heidelberg, 1972/[1925]
PPC Spinoza, Descartes’ Principles of Philosophy
Bennett, J. 1984. A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics. Indianapolis.
Broughton, J. 1986. “Adequate Causes and Natural Change in Descartes’ Philosophy.”  
In Human Nature and Natural Knowledge. Ed. by B. Donagan/A. Perovich/M. Wedin. 
Dortrecht. 
Caird, J. 1883. Spinoza. London.
53 See esp. E5p22–23 and E5p29–30. The eternal world is still a world that one “feels” – an expe-
rience of understanding something is an experience one has as an eternal mind (see E5p23s). 
What is understood and the act of understanding are eternal, so “remain” after the destruction of 
the enduring, finite human body (I discuss this more in Primus forthcoming. See also Rutherford 
1999). On the view I have explored here, what “remains” turns out to be all there really ever was.
54 This is not to say that having adequate ideas of the necessary relations between properties 
of enduring, finite things, or recognizing the necessity of enduring things’ determinations of 
other enduring things, is not affectively salutary. My point is just that there is room, in Spinoza’s 
system, for an even more dramatic affective transformation, and that this transformation comes 
about when one realizes that it is only one’s reality as an infinite, eternal mode that is fully intel-
ligible and genuinely real.
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thank Lilli Alanen, Janet Broughton, John Carriero, Tim Clarke, Tim Crockett, Michael Della Rocca, 
Catherine Flynn, Dan Garber, Colin Garretson, Don Garrett, Hannah Ginsborg, Sean Greenberg, 
John Grey, Karolina Hübner, Raphael Krut-Landau, Martin Lin, Colin Marshall, Yitzhak Melamed, 
David Nowakowski, Alison Peterman, Tad Schmaltz, Justin Vlasits, Daniel Warren, and Andy 
Younan. I would also like to thank students in my graduate seminars at Berkeley and audiences 
at UC Irvine, UCLA, the University of Mississippi, Mississippi State University, Simon Fraser Uni-
versity, and Stanford University. Most of all, I want to express my deep gratitude to the extraordi-
narily thoughtful and incisive anonymous referees.
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